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WOULD THE UNITED STATES DOCTRINE OF PREVENTIVE WAR BE 
JUSTIFIED AS A UNITED NATIONS DOCTRINE?  
 
Harry van der Linden  
 
On the same day, 23 September 2003, that President George W. Bush defended his 
Iraq policy to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan also spoke to the Assembly. Annan reiterated his opposition to the view that states 
may independently be justified in using military force “preemptively” to avoid the 
dangers posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) among states and 
terrorists, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. He added:  
 
But it is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the 
concerns that make some States feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is those concerns 
that drive them to take unilateral action. We must show that those concerns can, and 
will, be addressed effectively through collective action.
1
  
 
Accordingly, Annan proposed that the members of the United Nations Security 
Council “may need to begin a discussion on the criteria for an early authorization of 
coercive measures to address some types of threats—for instance, terrorist groups armed 
with weapons of mass destruction.” The Secretary-General promised to establish a “high-
level panel of eminent personalities” with the task of addressing the new security 
concerns. He requested the panel examine standards for collective humanitarian 
intervention and consider how to reform the United Nations and make the Security 
Council more representative. Emphasizing the importance of these issues, Annan said, 
“Excellencies, we have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less 
decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded.”
2
  
 
While Annan did not mention the United States by name, he obviously attacked the 
idea of unilateral preemptive war as defended in the National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America (NSS), issued in September 2002 and implemented by the Bush 
Administration in its war against Iraq.
3
 President Bush had previously suggested the need 
for preemptive war in the post-11 September 2001 world in his State of the Union 
Address of 2002 and in his graduation speech at West Point in June of the same year.   
 
Preemptive war as construed by the Bush Administration is more accurately called 
“preventive war.” Many commentators and scholars of international relations have 
criticized the Bush doctrine of “preemptive” war, but have paid little attention to the issue 
raised by Annan’s speech. (One exception is John W. Lango’s “Preventive Wars, Just 
War Principles, and the United Nations,” upon which I commented at the Central 
Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in 2003.
4
) Would a doctrine 
of preventive war to meet the threats posed by WMD be morally defensible as a 
collective doctrine? Should the Security Council have the authority to initiate preventive 
wars in response to emerging WMD threats?  
 
My aim here is to show that even though some of the main objections to unilateral 
preventive war are not, or are to a lesser degree, applicable to collective preventive war, it 
still would be a mistake for the United Nations to adopt this doctrine. I will defend my 
view on basis of the just war tradition. I will first articulate and assess the Bush doctrine 
of preventive war, and discuss how United Nations-authorized preventive war is less 
objectionable than its unilateralist variant.  
 
1. The Bush Doctrine of Preventive War  
 
The NSS argues that we have arrived at a historical turning point in that the 
security tasks of the government have fundamentally changed. In an apparent reference to 
11 September 2001, President Bush states in the Introduction to NSS that in the past only 
enemies with “great armies and great industrial capabilities” were able to threaten the 
national security of the United States, whereas now “shadowy networks of individuals 
can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single 
tank.”  
 
Strictly speaking, the possibility described by the NSS that terrorists would “turn 
the power of modern technologies against us” existed long before 11 September. 11 
September only vividly and tragically brought this possibility to the awareness of the 
public. The security policy statement continues to point out that the “gravest danger” 
facing the United States is that “our enemies” would acquire WMD. These enemies 
include “terrorists of global reach,” who commit “premeditated, politically motivated 
violence . . . against innocents,” and a small number of “rogue states” that emerged in the  
1990s. What characterizes these states is that they sponsor global terrorism, seek to 
acquire WMD and may make them available to terrorist groups that they harbor or 
sponsor, reject the United States and its liberal values, brutalize their people, and have 
engaged in aggressive conduct and even war against their neighbors.
5
  
 
The NSS offers a variety of broad strategies of dealing with the new security 
concerns, including reducing poverty through free trade and markets, promoting 
democracy and the rule of law, strengthening alliances against terrorism, and preventing 
regional conflicts through negotiation. It also seeks to more effectively track and 
intercept the export or traffic of WMD materials and knowledge. Most controversially, it 
argues that a new military response is necessary.  
 
Noting that “traditional concepts of deterrence” will not work against global 
terrorists who “seek martyrdom in death” and rogue states that sponsor them, the NSS 
maintains that the old notion of preemption must be adapted to the new security situation 
of the United States. In the past, international law allowed a first strike when an attack 
was imminent. Unambiguous measures of when a threat became imminent were patent: 
for example, troops would mobilize at the border or the air force would start preparing for 
attack. Today, we must expect that attacks against the United States by rogue states and 
terrorists will be nonconventional, sudden, undertaken with easily concealed weapons, 
and potentially disastrous when WMD are used. The NSS concludes:  
 
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the 
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as 
to the time and place of the enemy’s attack (emphasis added). To forestall or prevent 
such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act 
preemptively.
6
  
 
The NSS continues, when the “enemies of civilization” seek WMD, the United States 
“cannot remain idle while dangers gather.” The adaptation of the traditional preemption 
doctrine, then, involves that the Bush Administration has embraced what is more 
accurately called a doctrine of preventive war, which holds that to attack is just, even if 
when and where a great threat will materialize is doubtful. The doctrine is also 
unilateralist. The NSS states, “we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise 
our right to self-defense by acting preemptively against . . . terrorists [and] by convincing 
or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities [of not supporting terrorists 
in any way].”
7
  
 
The crucial difference between preemption and prevention lies in the certainty and 
immediacy of the threat. As put in a recent discussion of the Bush security doctrine, 
“preemption . . . is nothing more than a quick draw” (in a gun fight), while “preventive 
war is based on the concept that war is inevitable, and that it is better to fight now while 
the costs are low than later when the costs are high.”
8
 In the case of preventive war, the 
perception of the inevitability of war might be wrong and contribute to its occurrence, 
while in the case of preemption the threat is undeniably present, ready to be unleashed, 
and only force can meet it. A classic example of a preventive strike is Israel’s bombing in 
1981 of an Iraqi nuclear plant under construction at Osiraq. On the assumption that Israel 
had convincing evidence that Egypt would attack, which is nowadays no longer held to 
be the case, its first strike against Egypt in the Six Day War of 1967 fits the notion of 
preemption.   
 
In the “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” published in 
December 2002, the Bush Administration also embraces preventive war, calling it 
preemptive war. Again, since deterrence against terrorists and their state sponsors may 
not be successful, “preemptive measures” may be necessary. This requires the military to 
have “capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before these weapons 
are used.”
9
 Recent claims made by the Bush Administration about the threats posed by 
Syria and Iran, and how these threats may be met by military force, illustrate that the 
concept of preventive war guides this administration. The concept was also pivotal in the 
Bush Administration official defense of its war against Iraq.  
 
The NSS appears to justify using preventive military force against a variety of poorly 
distinguished targets. They include (1) states that are in the process of acquiring or 
further developing WMD and fail to respect broadly recognized international norms, (2) 
states that might enable terrorist organizations to acquire WMD in the near future, (3) 
states that harbor or support terrorists of global reach, (4) global terrorists that seek to 
develop WMD, and (5) global terrorists. What is confusing about the account of 
preventive war in the NSS is that only (1) and possibly (2), depending on its more 
detailed specification, involve preventive military force. Military force in (4) and (5) is 
defensive. This is so because the terrorists that are targeted by the Bush doctrine declared 
war on the United States and its allies many years prior to 11 September 2001. Seeking to 
prevent our enemies from harming us is not a preventive act if hostilities already have 
been declared.
10
 The William J. Clinton administration was already involved against the 
war on global terrorism. The term “war” is a misnomer here in that combating terrorism 
is mainly a matter of intelligence work, legal measures, and police work; it may involve 
limited military strikes, but those do not add up to war as commonly understood, as 
conflict involving the use of military force on a large scale, typically between states. Case 
(3) involves extending military force directed against the terrorists to the state that 
harbors or protects them. This would still be an instance of defensive military force, but 
we will see that it would seldom be justified because the harm it would bring about would 
likely be disproportionate to its possible benefits.  
 
Prior United States presidential administrations have recognized this point, but not the 
Bush Administration: the NSS boldly asserts, “We make no distinction between terrorists 
and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.” This suggests that war may be 
rightfully waged at any time against states that have global terrorists on their territory. 
The concept of terrorists of global reach is not well-defined (the only example given is al-
Qaeda), leaving open the possibility that the Bush Administration aims to justify that the  
United States has the right to wage war at any moment against states of its choosing that 
are linked to terrorism in general. The war against terrorism is a war without a definite 
end because, as the NSS declares, progress will only come “through the persistent 
accumulation of successes.”
11
  
 
I am mainly concerned here about Bush’s security doctrine as a preventive war 
doctrine, directly aiming at political regime change through military force to avoid 
expected future WMD threats. This is also what the NSS emphasizes most and how 
Annan appears to interpret the Bush doctrine. I assume that Annan also wishes the 
Security Council to consider adopting only a United Nations version of this more 
narrowly interpreted Bush doctrine, even though he gives the misleading example of 
early United Nations authorization of force against global terrorists with WMD. On any 
reasonable account of self-defense, we may use multilateral and even unilateral force 
against terrorists in possession of such weapons. States that actively protect these 
terrorists may become legitimate targets of a self-defensive war if it is the only way to 
meet the terrorist WMD threat. The real controversial issue is whether states may wage 
preventive war against states that might in the future provide terrorists with these 
weapons.  
 
The war against Iraq shows how unilateral preventive war can easily be a cover 
for aggression. The Bush Administration did not heed its warning in the NSS against the 
danger that “nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression.”
12
 This war was not 
preventive, humanitarian, or self-defensive, leaving the option that it was aggressive. Iraq 
under pressure allowed inspections of its suspected WMD sites, had no WMD that posed 
a threat to its neighbors (let alone the United States), was not recently trying to develop 
these weapons on a large scale, lacked the resources for doing so, and had proven to be 
responsive to deterrence.  
 
The humanitarian case for war was also weak in that Saddam Hussein’s 
oppressive and brutal regime in recent years had no genocidal policies against its people, 
while any argument of reactive self-defense was implausible in that Iraq did not harbor 
many terrorists with declared aggressive intentions toward the United States. 
Incompetence of intelligence or the culpable failure to seek or accept the relevant facts 
might factor into the act of aggression against Iraq, but growing evidence indicates that 
the United States deliberately and intentionally pursued war for the sake of serving the 
economic and geopolitical interests of the United States.
13
  
 
The imperial and hegemonic rhetoric of the NSS accentuates the worry that the 
doctrine of preventive war may function as a pretext for aggression. It proclaims that a 
“single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise,” 
exists and commits the United States to bring this model “to every corner of the world.”
14
 
The Bush security statement holds that the realization of this goal would bring lasting 
security. In the meantime, national interest and the promotion of security require that “we 
must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge,” “dissuade future military 
competition,” and create new “bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and 
Northeast Asia.”
15
  
 
This process of creating new military posts is well on its way in Eastern Europe, 
the Caspian Sea region, and the Persian Gulf region. No wonder, then, that the global 
community has reacted with distrust and disapproval of the Bush preventive war doctrine, 
a tool of expanding and maintaining United States hegemony. The situation is made 
worse by the NSS leaving the possibility open that the war on terrorism is a preventive 
war without a definite end and one that may be waged against all states harboring or 
sponsoring terrorism.  
 
The doctrine of unilateral preventive war has a strong destabilizing effect. As 
Annan put it in his recent speech to the General Assembly, if all nations would “reserve 
the right to act unilaterally,” we might see “a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless 
use of force.” The problem is not only that there would be an increase in aggressive wars 
under the cloak of prevention, but also that nations sincerely might have distorted 
perceptions of when such wars might be justified. Longstanding conflicts between 
nations lead to distorted perceptions of the other nation’s aims and intentions, and a 
unilateralist universe has no requirement that we seek to correct such perceptions through 
international dialogue. The result may be especially disastrous in the case of conflicts 
between nations with WMD capabilities.  
 
A final objection to the Bush doctrine is that it violates international law. The 
NSS obscures this fact by equating preemptive war and preventive war and then by 
arguing that traditional international law allows the first. Preventive war has always been 
a violation of customary international law, while with the adoption of the United Nations 
Charter even unilateral preemptive war may no longer be legal. Its article 51 allows 
unilateral military force only in the case of “self-defense [against] an armed attack.” But 
perhaps a case can be made that since the Charter does not explicitly reject prior 
customary international law on this score it may be assumed that self-defense includes 
narrowly defined anticipatory self-defense—preemption in the strict sense—and is not 
limited to reactive self-defense only.  
 
2. The Lesser Evil of a Collective Preventive War Doctrine  
 
These objections to a doctrine of preventive war are primarily objections to 
unilateral resort to preventive war and to the United States in particular acting on this 
principle. It leaves the possibility open that United Nations authorized— collective or 
multilateral—preventive war against states might be justified as a response to future 
WMD threats. United Nations-authorized preventive war would reduce the worries of 
escalation and of preventive war as pretext for aggression. Once the decision to initiate 
preventive war is placed in the hands of the Security Council ulterior motives or distorted 
perceptions are less likely to determine the decision making process because of the 
impact of dialogic interaction. As proponents of discourse ethics and deliberative 
democracy have shown, through dialogic interaction, limited and particular perspectives 
can be overcome, so that the parties in dialogue arrive at a more generalized and impartial 
understanding of what decision or policy best takes into account the interests of all.
16
  
 
Here Annan’s call for an expanded and more representative Security Council is 
relevant in that the logic of deliberation is that its just outcome requires all those affected 
be involved in the dialogic process. A further requirement is that all participants should 
be on equal footing to prevent the phenomenon that vulnerable parties are silenced or 
unduly influenced in their views by more powerful parties. In this regard, the economic 
and political dominance of the United States, and more broadly that of the North (the 
developed world), poses an obstacle to fair decision making.  
 
Still, as the Security Council’s deliberations about the United States push for war 
on Iraq show, this body can come to a greater degree of objectivity than is true of any 
individual state, such as the United States. These same deliberations also suggest that a 
doctrine of United Nations-authorized preventive war would have a lesser risk of 
expanding and strengthening American hegemony than its unilateralist variant. If the 
Security Council had had its way, the United States would not have succeeded in 
expanding its military presence in the Middle East.  
 
The United Nations Charter does not preclude that the Security Council 
authorizes preventive war, solving the issue of international law. Chapter VII of the 
Charter discusses how the Security Council may respond to “threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” The spread of WMD may be classified as 
a threat to the peace. Article 41 calls for nonmilitary solutions, but Article 42 stipulates 
that when these have failed an armed response by member states under the authority of 
the Security Council may be warranted. Accordingly, on the assumption that non-military 
solutions would fail to eliminate the treat of nations with aggressive designs acquiring 
WMD or enabling terrorists to obtain WMD, the Security Council has the right to 
authorize preventive war.  
 
3. Objections to a United Nations Doctrine of Preventive War  
 
Should we conclude then with some scholars of international relations and 
security, such as Joseph Nye, that the United Nations should embrace the concept of 
preventive war in response to the emerging danger of WMD falling into the wrong 
hands?
17
 Critics from both the left and right have objected to unilateral preventive war on 
basis of the principle that the world community should uphold the sovereignty of states if 
they are not engaged in acts of aggression toward other states. This principle has been the 
dominant policy of the United Nations since its inception and precludes Security Council 
authorization of preventive war.  
 
The international community increasingly accepting humanitarian intervention 
within the international community shows that they have called the principle into 
question. Annan’s request that the panel investigating preventive war also studies the 
norms of collective humanitarian intervention reflects his view that claims of sovereignty 
lose their force once states inflict gross human rights violations on their people.
18
  
 
In defense of Annan’s view, what warrants the treatment of the state as a 
sovereign entity is that the state approximates the just state as an expression of the will of 
the people. Not the state as a mere legal order or instrument of power, but the state as the 
collective self-determination of the people, deserves moral recognition. Humanitarian 
emergencies typically involve struggles of self-determination suppressed by states. The 
state no longer provides many citizens even the minimal condition of self-determination, 
the protection of human life itself, and so the state loses its legitimacy and normative 
claim to sovereignty. To value sovereignty as such is to value a shield behind which 
brutal oppression can triumph.
19
  
 
A United Nations doctrine of preventive war would mean taking an additional 
step beyond the traditional standard of when sovereignty must be upheld. Considerations 
of “just cause” show that we should not take this additional step. Following traditional 
just war theory, a war has a just cause only as a response to some definite wrong. In the 
words of Thomas Aquinas, “those against whom the war is waged deserve such a 
response because of some offense on their part.”
20
 During the period of the colonization 
of the Americas, Francisco de Vitoria made the same point, “the sole and only just cause 
for waging war is when harm has been inflicted.”
21
 A state may engage in war in 
response to an attack, but the state may not go to war to achieve some perceived good, 
such as conversion, “civilizing” people, and, in our time, promoting democracy.  
 
Humanitarian intervention has a just cause as a response to the wrong of massive 
human rights violations. The aim is to prevent the wrong from occurring in its full scale, 
but a military intervention is only justified if a history of rights violations exists and other 
undeniable evidence exists that indicates a humanitarian disaster is about to happen. 
Including narrowly defined anticipatory self-defense as a just cause is more problematic. 
The wrong here is mostly about to happen, and we must acknowledge that those who 
consider a preemptive strike may be mistaken about the intentions and aims of the enemy 
nation. If so, they would unleash the harms of war without being a victim of an 
unavoidable harm, making the war initiative an act of aggression. The risk of this 
injustice becomes intolerably large in the case of preventive war against other nations 
seeking to acquire WMD.  
 
Consider nuclear weapons. No doubt, proliferation of nuclear weapons increases 
tension in international affairs, but the harm done by any given state merely seeking to 
acquire or obtain these weapons is too diffuse and too limited to count as a just cause. So 
it must be argued, for example, that dictatorial and repressive regimes with suspected 
aggressive designs cannot be entrusted with these weapons, while their possession by 
established democracies is not a serious threat. This standard, though, is less than 
convincing since the United States is the only state with a track record of using nuclear 
weapons. It also has a history of threatening to use these weapons against both its nuclear 
and non-nuclear enemies. The Bush Administration publicly has reserved the right to use 
nuclear weapons against any nation attacking the United States or its allies with chemical 
or biological weapons, while according to its classified but leaked Nuclear Posture 
Review of January 2002, it also might be prepared to use these weapons to prevent such 
attacks. Partly for this second purpose is the Bush Administration interested in 
developing new and smaller nuclear weapons, increasing the likelihood of their use. 
22
  
 
We could alternatively argue that since almost all states have signed the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), entered into force in 1970, it would 
be a definite wrong for most states to acquire these weapons. A mere violation of this 
treaty, or a withdrawal from the treaty, is not a wrong of such proportion that it would be 
a just cause for war. It would be morally untenable to militarily enforce nonproliferation 
as long as the NPT parties in possession of nuclear weapons ignore article 6 of this treaty, 
committing them:  
 
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on 
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
23
  
 
We should support this article because people around the world lack knowledge about the 
conditions that may trigger a nuclear war, so to accept the status quo of a limited number 
of nations having possession of nuclear weapons would be a mistake. Only the total 
abolition of nuclear weapons could provide us with real assurance that no nation will use 
these weapons.  
 
We can make similar observations concerning biological and chemical weapons. 
The world community is, in theory, committed to their abolition. But notwithstanding the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) entered into force in 1975, and the 
new Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force in 1997, a dozen or so 
counties that are known or strongly suspected to have programs of developing or actively 
maintaining biological or chemical weapons still exist, including China, Iran, Syria, 
Egypt, Israel, and North Korea.
24
  
 
Again, mere acquisition is not a sufficient wrong for war, and we do not know 
which nations’ development of these weapons is undeniably a great threat. What further 
complicates the picture is that several nations committed to destroying their chemical 
weapons (required by the CWC) still have huge stockpiles of them and that research 
programs focused on defense against biological weapons (permitted by the BTWC) can 
easily turn into programs with offensive purposes. Intelligence especially with regard to 
biological weapons is difficult and unreliable. International teams monitoring compliance 
would be helpful, but the Bush Administration has rejected international efforts to add an 
inspection regime to the BTWC.
25
  
 
In sum, the justification of preventive war is based on the flawed notion that we 
can know which nations will inevitably commit a great wrong to other nations once they 
have acquired WMD. Terms like “rogue nations” and “axis of evil” have little descriptive 
and predictive value, but they make it easier, if it turns out that a preventive war was 
based on a false premise, to fall back on what has been called “altruistic permissivism” 
with regard to the use of military force.
26
 This is the view that war may be waged for the 
good of the people of the other nation. The case of Iraq is instructive. Now that WMD 
have not been found, some moral reason has to be provided for causing thousands of 
deaths and wounded. The most common rationale offered for the war and the occupation 
is that it will bring democracy, freedom, and higher living standards to people. But the 
people were never asked whether they wanted to pay the price for these still elusive 
benefits. Seldom noted, this reasoning blatantly contradicts the just war tradition and the 
main tenet of international law concerning resort to military force: war is defensible only 
to right a great wrong, not to bring about some good. Once we accept the second 
standard, no significant restrictions on initiating war remain. After all, regime change 
may be desirable in many, if not most, countries across the globe. The preventive war 
doctrine is, to some extent, self-defeating, even if adopted by the United Nations instead 
of unilaterally, in that nations may come to the decision to acquire WMD as deterrence 
against counter-proliferation wars.  
 
Another problem with United Nations authorization of preventive war is that the 
current composition of the Security Council is such that its decisions will be selective, 
even if more impartial than unilateral decisions. The Council would veto preventive war 
against Israel or China, and obtaining its authorization for a preventive war against North 
Korea would be improbable. But envisioning that the Security Council would approve of 
war against Iran or Syria is easy. No impartial standard that warrants such outcomes 
exists. Power politics would significantly determine preventive war authorization instead 
of threat assessment alone. Perhaps the problem would become manageable once the 
United Nations authorization of military force would become more democratic and less 
subject to the national interests of the permanent members of the Security Council, but it 
would be a mistake to argue for a United Nations preventive war doctrine now on the 
basis of what the United Nations might become.  
 
Considering the great potential harm nations with WMD might inflict on other 
countries, inconsistent action, action with the risk of a wrong assessment of the threat 
posed by the enemy, or even action that might contribute to proliferation, might appear to 
be better than no action at all. In response, to act justly is crucial, and the risk of harm 
that we must accept to avoid inflicting a great wrong is extremely high. That we initiate 
war, with its great human costs and often unexpected and unintended harmful 
consequences, based on the justification that in so doing we have a small, modest, or even 
significant likelihood that we can prevent another nation from doing harm to us is 
morally indefensible. To be morally defensible, we must have almost absolute certainty 
that the potential for harm to us is imminent. This level of certainty—except in 
hindsight—is typically not within our grasp.  
 
War must be a last resort measure, which points to another major objection to a 
United Nations doctrine of preventive war. I believe that most states could be effectively 
discouraged from acquiring WMD through peaceful means such as conditional economic 
support and negotiations. It would further help if countries of the North would cease to 
support or put into power militarily and economically dictatorial regimes in the South 
(the developing world), turning a blind eye to these regimes acquiring WMD as long as 
they stay in line.  
 
Even when states have acquired WMD, deterrence from employing them is still 
possible. The NSS sidesteps this point by failing to differentiate between so-called rogue 
states and the terrorist groups these rogue states allegedly sponsor. Correctly noting that 
global terrorist groups that seek martyrdom cannot be effectively deterred, the NSS 
jumps to the conclusion that rogue states cannot be effectively deterred. Iraq is not a 
counterexample because the United States never tried to deter its use of chemical 
weapons against Iraqi Kurds and enemy soldiers in the war with Iran.  
 
This leaves the problem of whether United Nations-authorized preventive war 
may not be necessary to avoid the risk that some state would enable global terrorists to 
acquire WMD. At the outset, we should note that the NSS overstates the interests of 
terrorist groups in seeking to acquire WMD and their capability to use them effectively, 
creating a fear among the public conducive to the Bush Administration’s hegemonic 
purposes.
27
  
 
The political objectives of most terrorist groups are not well served by inflicting 
many WMD-caused casualties. If they did, they would lose the public support and 
sympathy needed to realize their goals. Also, many technological obstacles to creating 
and using WMD effectively exist. To date, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo has been the 
only non-state actor that has created and used WMD on a significant scale. Between 1990 
and 1995, the cult used biological and chemical weapons on no fewer than seventeen 
occasions. Only its chemical attacks were successful, the most devastating one being the 
attack with the nerve agent sarin (in low-grade and impure form) on the Tokyo subway 
on 20 March 1995. The attack exposed approximately 5000 people to the nerve gas, 
killed 12 persons, and left hundreds with minor injuries and dozens with severe injuries.
28
 
Horrendous as the attack may appear, the harm done was small compared to the harm that 
Aum Shinrikyo could have inflicted with conventional weapons if the cult had invested 
similar efforts and resources in doing so.  
 
A strong disincentive for terrorist groups to use WMD exists in that doing so 
successfully would likely lead to their destruction and the destruction of their enemies, 
either because of the dangers inherent to using WMD or because of a devastating 
retaliatory response. The events of 11 September 2001 give credibility to the view that 
some terrorist groups might be prepared to use WMD. In political, cultural, and 
geographical terms, their supportive audience may be far removed from the location of 
their destructive act. They may not care about their survival. So the issue we need to 
address is how a terrorist group seeking to obtain WMD with the assistance of some state 
might materialize, keeping in mind that most terrorist groups will not seek to pursue this 
course of action.  
 
One possibility is that some state with WMD will provide these weapons to global 
terrorists harbored in another state, or that this state might welcome terrorists within its 
borders and then provide them with WMD. Waging war against a state suspected of 
planning to act in one of these ways would be a preventive war, and it would be a wrong 
war because the anticipated harm is too speculative and doubtful to count as a definite 
wrong and so as a just cause. Since tracing the source of WMD used by global terrorists 
would be fairly easy, concealing complicity would be nearly impossible. The risk of 
incurring retaliation deters states from providing such weapons to terrorists. The greater 
risk is that global terrorists, through force, theft, or deception, acquire WMD materials 
from states with nuclear weapons, civilian stockpiles of highly enriched uranium or 
plutonium, biodefense programs, stockpiles of chemical weapons, and the like. The 
solution includes greater security, stricter control regimes, a more rapid destruction of all 
chemical weapons (as required by the CWC), curtailment of biodefense, the elimination 
of fissile material from civilian nuclear programs, and, ultimately, the elimination of all 
nuclear weapons.  
 
Another possibility is that a state sponsoring or harboring global terrorists is 
assisting these terrorists in acquiring WMD capabilities. Again, this scenario is not likely 
to occur because any state engaging in such conduct knows that the probable outcome is 
war. War in this case would not be a preventive war but a defensive war because a state 
targeted by global terrorists has a just cause to go to war with states that actively protect 
these terrorists. A state may remain neutral in a conflict that spills over on its territory, 
but a state cannot legitimately demand neutrality when it actively supports a warring 
group.
29
 In most situations, initiating war would be wrong because other alternatives 
might be available for addressing the harm done, such as pressuring the country to turn 
the terrorists over to the courts.  
 
Significantly, a justified war, following the just war tradition, must satisfy the 
principle of proportionality, and extending the war on terrorism to a war on states would 
generally not satisfy this principle. The principle requires that the expected costs of war 
are proportionate to its anticipated benefits. Estimating the costs of war is difficult since 
it often has many unexpected consequences. The benefits of waging war against states to 
combat terrorism are also difficult to ascertain in that the goal of getting rid of terrorists 
in a given country might appear successful, but terrorists can regroup in different 
countries or new terrorists can be recruited. War may motivate new volunteers. Overall, 
the harm generated by war between states will typically outweigh the harm that terrorists 
will inflict, and so it would be wrong to go war with states that sponsor terrorists.  
 
The Bush doctrine sets aside considerations of proportionality in suggesting that 
we have no need to distinguish between sponsoring states and terrorists as potential 
targets of military force. Only one situation exists in which the proportionality principle 
definitely tilts towards war: when the sponsoring state enables the terrorists to acquire 
WMD. Even so, we should not exaggerate the dangers of WMD in the hands of terrorists 
abroad by ignoring the problem of effective delivery systems needed for creating large-
scale human destruction. Prior to extending the war from the terrorists to the sponsoring 
state, the United States government would have ample time to seek Security Council 
authorization and submit the case for war to the world court of opinion.  
 
4. WMD and United States Military Hegemony  
 
In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Annan distinguished 
between “hard” and “soft” threats. The first are the threats of terrorism and WMD; the 
second are the threats to peace and security posed by the persistence of poverty, income 
inequalities across the globe, the spread of communicable diseases, environmental 
destruction, and the like. Annan called on the United Nations to deal with both threats, 
arguing that both tasks are related. He continued: “We now see, with chilling clarity, that 
a world where many millions of people endure brutal oppression and extreme misery will 
never be fully secure, even for its most privileged inhabitants.”
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We would be hard pressed to disagree with Annan. The NSS acknowledges a 
similar point by observing that “poverty does not make poor people into terrorists,” but 
“poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist 
networks.”
31
 Yet, the NSS offers little in terms of how poverty, weak states, and other 
social conditions conducive to terrorism and violent conflict can be eliminated. The 
emphasis is on the military response, and so are the commitments of the Bush 
Administration.  
 
Since 11 September 2001, the United States has followed a course of building up 
its military and developing new weapons programs, while peace efforts and resources 
assigned for reducing “soft threats” remain relatively minuscule. The United States 
spends close to half of the world’s military expenditures, and it spends about thirty times 
as much as the states that it has declared at one point or another to be rogue states, 
including Syria, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan.
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The increasing United States military hegemony is a crucial factor in the spread of 
WMD. Theorists frequently espouse that terrorism emerges in situations of asymmetric 
conflict. The terrorist, the underdog, sets aside the rules of war, and fights dirty, in the 
anticipation that it will be effective against the militarily much stronger opponent.
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 What 
adds to the use of terrorist methods by non-state actors is that the United States has a long 
history of terrorist actions, ranging from the bombing of civilian centers to supporting 
covert actions against dissenting civilians.  
 
Less often noted is that states may seek to acquire WMD in response to United 
States military hegemony. The NSS acknowledges the point to some extent. After stating 
that rogue states see WMD as “tools of intimidation and military aggression against their 
neighbors,” the NSS observes that these weapons may be acquired with the intent to deter 
the United States from responding to these aggressions. The NSS continues, “Such states 
also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of 
the United States.”
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We cannot fully understand even the current use and popularity of the phrase 
WMD without reference to United States military hegemony. Current international 
security literature commonly defines WMDs as biological, chemical, and nuclear 
weapons.
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 The Bush Administration and the media popularized the term with the same 
meaning especially in the months before the war against Iraq in 2003.  
 
Why are these three types of weapons grouped together as weapons of mass 
destruction? True, nuclear weapons stand out due to their enormous destructive potential, 
but many chemical and biological weapons are less destructive than some conventional 
weapons. Alternatively, the indiscriminate nature of these three types of weapons might 
appear to warrant the WMD label, but many other weapons are similarly indiscriminate, 
inevitably killing large numbers of civilians. We do not call economic sanctions WMD. 
Yet the economic sanctions against Iraq during the 1990s claimed hundreds of thousands 
of lives because the sanctions restricted the import of water purification equipment, 
medical equipment, drugs, and the like, and created food shortages.
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 Depleted uranium, 
land mines, and cluster bombs are not included, even though they have left behind 
countless dead children and civilians. The United States is developing space weapons 
such as space-based lasers, negating several United Nations resolutions calling for use of 
space for peaceful purposes only.
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 We can predict that most people will never call these 
weapons WMD, but they can be equally destructive.  
 
All this suggests that the notion of WMD in its current use is partly ideologically 
tainted. Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are grouped together and popularized 
as WMD because the United States views their acquisition by countries from the South as 
a (varying) challenge to its military superiority. Nuclear weapons can fulfill this role due 
to their sheer destructive potential alone, while biological and chemical weapons pose a 
challenge because they are difficult to detect and have a surprise and unpredictable 
element in their potential application.  
 
To stop the proliferation of WMD, then, will require that the United States ends 
its military build-up, because the more the United States seeks to assert its military 
superiority the more its pushes countries resisting this hegemony toward developing 
WMD.
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 Instead of seeking to articulate standards of preventive war, the United Nations 
would do better to focus on the problem of how the organization can be effective and able 
to contribute to global democracy and peace in the face of increasing United States 
military hegemony and the new weapons that the United States is developing for this 
purpose.  
 
5. Postscript  
 
The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, formed by Annan after 
his speech to the United Nations General Assembly, issued its report A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility (MSW) in December 2004.
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 In accordance with my 
arguments here, that report rejects the legality and morality of unilateral preventive war 
and objects to any weakening of article 51 of the United Nations Charter to accommodate 
a broader notion of self-defense. In accordance with my view, MSW also offers valuable 
non-military recommendations for dealing with the threat of the spread of WMD among  
states or terrorist groups, such as: the current nuclear weapon states should move toward 
disarmament in accordance with the NPT; negotiations should be renewed among parties 
to the BTWC concerning a verification protocol; and we must reduce poverty and 
promote democracy and human and political rights so as to diminish fertile breeding 
grounds for terrorism.
40
  
 
In opposition to my view, MSW favors a collective preventive military response to 
meet the threat posed by the spread of WMD among terrorists and some states. The Panel 
rightly maintains the Security Council has the authority under Chapter VII to declare a 
preventive war, but it wrongly continues to claim that the Security Council must prepare 
for this option in our present situation:  
 
In the world of the twenty-first century, the international community does have to be 
concerned about nightmare scenarios combining terrorists, weapons of mass 
destruction and irresponsible States, and much more besides, which may conceivably 
justify the use of force, not just reactively but preventively and before a latent threat 
becomes imminent. . . . The Council may well need to be prepared to be much more 
proactive on these issues, taking more decisive action earlier, than it has been in the 
past.
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MSW here makes the same error as the NSS in failing the distinguish between a 
variety of scenarios in which military force might be used against states or terrorist 
groups seeking to acquire WMD, only some of which would be properly characterized as 
preventive war. Lack of accuracy invites abuse of preventive military force, or fear of 
such abuse, and so collective security would be reduced if the Security Council adopted 
the Panel’s preventive war doctrine.  
 
Other objections to the doctrine as espoused by the Panel are:  
 
(1) the problem of inaccurate intelligence concerning WMD programs is not solved;  
(2) no attempt is made to define “irresponsible States” (an apparent euphemism for 
the “rogues states” referred to in the NSS); and  
(3) the document fails to explain why deterrence against “irresponsible States” that 
have acquired WMD might not be effective.  
 
MSW addresses only one objection raised in my paper against a United Nations 
preventive war doctrine, the Security Council, due to its composition, lacks the capability 
to make objective decisions about when preventive war might be warranted.  
 
The Panel proposes two models for expanding the Council: they have in common 
that all major regions in the world would be equally represented with a total of twenty-
four members, while the number of countries with veto power would remain the same.
42
 
It will be difficult to realize this proposal, and in the meantime preventive war decisions 
by the Security Council will be highly selective.  
 
Finally, MSW proposes that the Security Council and all United Nations Member 
States use the following “five basic criteria of legitimacy” in considering when to 
authorize the use of military force in general: “seriousness of threat,” “proper purpose,” 
“last resort,” “proportional means,” and “balance of consequences.”
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 The second and 
third of these criteria correspond to the traditional jus ad bellum (“right to war”) 
principles of “right intention” and “last resort,” while the fourth and fifth combine the 
principles of “proportionality” and “reasonable chance of success.” The jus ad bellum 
principle of “legitimate authority” is not mentioned, understandably so, because MSW 
assumes that the United Nations Charter answers the question of where right authority is 
to be located. The second through fifth criteria constitute significant constraints on the 
authorization of military force, if properly applied.  
 
The problem with the Panel’s list of criteria is the standard of “seriousness of 
threat.” It replaces “just cause” in just war theory with the standard that force may be 
warranted when a state is seriously threatened. This substitution is quite broad and vague 
and allows so much leeway in its application that its general acceptance would lead us to 
a less secure world.  
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